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THE COMMISSION AND THE COURTS
Stanley H. Fuld*
I
THE COMMrISSION AS A MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

No system of jurisprudence, whether statutory or common law, can
ignore the need for continuing self-appraisal and adjustment to meet the
pfoblems of a dynamic and complex society. Rules fashioned in other
days and in the context of other conditions, whether by the legislature
or the courts, may prove inadequate or unjust in the light of subsequent
experience under altered social or economic conditions. Properly to fulfill its role as a stable, and yet a just, regulatory force, the law must
obviously keep pace with changing times while at the same time adhering to basic principles and maintaining necessary continuity with our
rich legal heritage.
In achieving that goal, the judiciary as well as the legislature has a
function to perform, each within its own sphere. Although our jurisprudence has its roots in the common law, there has been constantly increasing resort in recent years to legislation to weed out the defects and
correct the anachronisms that develop. Legislative intervention has come
to the assistance of the courts particularly where the doctrine of stare
decisis has deterred change by judicial decision.
That is not to say that stare decisis has been an insuperable barrier
to judicial re-examination and revision of prior rulings which latter day
developments have shown to be erroneous or archaic.' As perusal of the
books readily discloses, the courts themselves have on occasion modified
or overruled decisions earlier made, in response to current needs and
experience.' There is no doubt, however, that the interests of stability
and certainty, particularly in fields such as those involving property interests and commercial transactions, may often preclude judicial de* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 764, for biographical data.
1 See Loughran, "Authoritative Force of Precedents," 10 N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n Bar
Bulletin 125-134, 180-189 (1952-53) ; Douglas, "Stare Decisis," 4 Bar Ass'n Record 152
(1949); Green, "The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which
It Should Be Applied," 40 Ill. L. Rev. 303 (1946).
2 See, e.g., Baker v. Lorillard, 4 N.Y. 257, 261 (1850); Rumsey v. N.Y. & N.E. R.R.
Co., 133 N.Y. 79, 85, 30 N.E. 654, 655 (1892); Klein v. Maravelas, 219 N.Y. 383, 114 N.E.
809 (1916) ; Vaughan v. State, 272 N.Y. 102, 5 N.E.2d 53 (1936); Village of Lawrence v.
Greenwood, 300 N.Y. 231, 90 N.E.2d 53 (1949); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102
N.E.2d 691 (1951). See also, Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
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parture from settled rules of law, no matter how antiquated.' In such
areas, any change of decision made by the courts would necessarily be
retroactive in application, and the courts have rightly been loath to announce new rules which would adversely affect transactions entered into
in reliance on previously declared doctrines.4 The legislature, on the
other hand, would not be subject to any such limitation, since legislation
generally has a prospective effect.5
Judicial reluctance to overturn a settled decisional rule or the prior
interpretation of a statute has, moreover, often controlled the course of
decision even where there could be no prejudice by reason of reliance on
the law as previously announced.' Here, too, obviously, alteration or
modification by statute affords a vital remedy, and the courts themselves,
when bound by precedent, have frequently noted that the problem is one
7
for legislative consideration.
A further restriction on the availability of judicial change is that it can
generally occur only at the appellate level, and the difficulty and expense
of appeal may limit the possibility of such essential review. The tribunals
at nisi prius will rarely take it upon themselves to depart from the decision of an upper court, and where, as in this state, there are different
grades of appellate courts, the intermediate appellate tribunals will generally not assume the power to override the decision of a higher court.
Moreover, a court may properly decline to overturn a decisional rule
or to announce a new or modified one, where the problem presented entails complex considerations that transcend the particular case and
cannot be resolved in the context of the litigation before the court.8
Sometimes, indeed, the question may turn on problems of a technical
3 See, e.g., Crowley v. Lewis, 239 N.Y. 264, 146 N.E. 374 (1925); Cammack v. Slattery
& Bro., Inc., 241 N.Y. 39, 148 N.E. 781 (1925); Madfes v. Beverly Development Corp.,
251 N.Y. 12, 166 N.E. 787 (1929) ; Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal Science 67 (1928).
4 See, e.g., Cammack v. Slattery & Bro., Inc., 241 N.Y. 39, 46, 148 N.E. 781, 782 (1925).
5 See Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 294 N.Y. 180, 188-189, 61 N.E.2d 435, 439 (1945).
6 See, e.g., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 187, 174 N.E. 441, 447 (1931);
Schindler v. Royal Insurance Co., 258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711 (1932); Meyers v. Credit
Lyonnais, 259 N.Y. 399, 182 N.E. 61 (1932); Maher v. Randolph, 275 N.Y. 80, 9 N.E.2d
786 (1937); Sweet & Co. v. Provident Loan Society, 279 N.Y. 540, 18 N.E.2d 847 (1939);
cf. Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N.Y. 287, 291-292, 176 N.E. 397, 398 (1931).
7 See, e.g., Crowley v. Lewis, 239 N.Y. 264, 266, 146 N.E. 374 (1925); Cammack v.
Slattery & Bro., Inc., 241 N.Y. 39, 46, 148 N.E. 781, 782 (1925) ; Schindler v. Royal Insurance Co., 258 N.Y. 310, 314, 179 N.E. 711, 712 (1932); Sternlieb v. Normandie Nat. Sec.
Corp., 263 N.Y. 245, 251, 188 N.E. 726, 728 (1934); Sweet & Co. v. Provident Loan Society, 279 N.Y. 540, 545, 18 N.E.2d 847, 848 (1939).
8 See Heineman, "A Law Revision Commission for Illinois," 42 Ill.
L. Rev. 697, 701
(1948).
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nature demanding investigation for which the courts are not equipped.'
These are all zones better reserved for legislative action.
The legislature undoubtedly has the power to provide the necessary remedy in these situations inwhich the courts feel themselves powerless to act. The legislature, however, is predominantly occupied with
matters of public law and policy problems affecting the state government,
and it may have neither the time nor the facilities to undertake the systematic and scientific revision of the large body of private law.1 0 It has,
accordingly, long been recognized that there is need for a permanent competent agency to serve as the liaison between the courts and the legislature, to devote itself to continuous survey and study of the operation of
the judicial process and to make appropriate recommendations to the
legislature whenever the need arises for legislative intervention to correct either shortcomings in the body of judicially-declared rules of law
or defects in the statutory law uncovered by judicial interpretation. 1
In 1921, Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo sounded the call for the creation
of a Ministry of Justice "to watch, the law in action, observe the manner
of its functioning, and report the changes needed when function is deranged."' 2 The call was not answered until 1934, when, upon the recommendation of the Commission on the Administration of Justice, 13 the
legislature created a permanent agency, known, as the Law Revision
Commission, to fill that need." The Commission was specifically directed
to make a continuous study of the decisional and statutory law for the
purpose of discovering "defects" and "anachronisms," and to recommend
needed changes to bring the law "into harmony with modern condi15

tions."

Scientific revision of the private law requires a scholarly yet functional approach by disinterested experts who will apply themselves with
diligence, broad perspective and restraint and who will view the need
and desirability of a particular change, not in isolation, but in relation
9 See Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 355-356, 102 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1951). See also dissenting opinion of Lewis, J., 303 N.Y. 349, 357, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1951).
10 See Stone and Pettee, "Revision of Private Law," 54 Harv. L. Rev. 221, 223-224
(1940); Heineman, supra note 8, at 716.
11 See Cardozo, "A Ministry of Justice," 35 Harv. L. Rev. 113 (1921) ; Pound, "Anachronisms in the Law," 3 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 142 (1920) ; Pasley, "Jurisprudence: Legal History:
Ministry of justice," 20 Cornell L.Q. 119 (1934).
12 See Cardozo, supra note 11, at 114.
13 See Report of Commission on the Administration of justice in New York State, Leg.
Doc. No. 50 at 51-56 (1934).
14 N.Y. Legis. Law, Art. 4-A, §§ 70-72, as added by Laws 1934, c. 597.
15 N.Y. Legis. Law § 72.
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to the whole body of the law. The revisers must not only exercise the
utmost care in determining whether there is a need for legislative intervention and, if so, the sort of statutory correctives most appropriate, but
they must also take heed to choose language adequate to accomplish the
end in view. Legislative draftsmanship is itself an extremely fine art,
requiring precise, direct and clear expression which will meet the problem
at hand, and yet not yield unintended results going far beyond the
demonstrated need. Ill-considered or poorly drafted statutory revision
may well usher in more troublesome problems or produce more serious
defects than the evils sought to be remedied.
The Law Revision Commission has discharged its functions admirably, with skill and diligent application, and has fully justified the
hopes and expectations of its founders. When it embarked upon its appointed task, many defects and anachronisms, which the courts felt powerless to eliminate, stood deeply rooted in the law. In careful, methodical fashion, and only after comprehensive and painstaking study of
the problems involved, the Commission recommended legislation designed
to root out many antiquated and unjust rules of law, whose only reason
for being was often merely that of historical accident. Today, many of
the changes effected as the result of the Commission's proposals are taken
for granted, without realization of the thought and labor that went into
the work.
THE WoiJ AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE COMINssIoN

Over one hundred and fifty recommendations made by the Commission,
of different degrees of importance, and covering a wide variety of fields,
have been enacted into law during the twenty years of its existence.
Some of the proposals entailed simplification, clarification or rearrangement of existing statutory provisions.'8 However, its principal contribu-

tions have consisted of major reforms affecting concepts of wide application, as well as rules governing specific situations.
In the field of contracts, the Commission has succeeded in securing
the abolition of the ancient doctrine as to the sanctity of the seal, and
in substituting therefor provisions permitting contracting parties to ac16 E.g., Laws 1950, c. 823, Leg. Doc. No. 65 (A), Report of Law Rev. Com. 27-47 (1950)
(assignment of earnings); Laws 1950, c. 758, Leg. Doc. No. 65 (L), Report of Law Rev.
Com. 285-360 (1950) (assignment for benefit of creditors); Laws 1939, c. 870, Leg. Doc. No.
65 (I), Report of Law Rev. Com. 385-389 (1939) (consolidation of the several acts governing Public Authorities).
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complish, by a simple agreement in writing, many of the advantages
formerly available through the use of the seal.17 The doctrine of consideration has -been modified in significant respects, to accord with the
practices of the business community and to give binding force to certain
types of agreements, including executory accords, though not supported
by consideration as traditionally defined.'
In the area of torts, the Commission has been responsible for the
abrogation of other ancient rules which were productive of apparent
injustice--for example, that a cause of action for personal injury did not
survive the death of the injured person or of the wrongdoer' 9 and that
an infant plaintiff, suing for personal injuries, might be charged with
contributory negligence on the part of his parent or other custodian.20
Another change has been to extend the liability of receivers, appointed in
mortgage foreclosure actions, to cases in which they are chargeable with
passive negligence. 2 '
Significant reforms have also been effected in the field of real property. The Commission has modernized and broadened the scope of the
statutory action for securing a determination of adverse claims and removing clouds on title. 2 And it has brought about important statutory
changes concerning the recording of executory contracts for the sale of
17 Laws 1941, c. 329, adding N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 342, N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 282, and
N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 33-c, and amending N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 14, N.Y. Civ. Prac.
Act §§ 47, 47-a, 48 and 11; Laws 1941, c. 328, amending N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 279 and
N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 33; Laws 1941, c. 330, amending N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 279 and
N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 33; see Leg. Doc. No. 65 (m), Report of Law Rev. Com. 345-414
(1941).
Is Laws 1936, c. 281, adding N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 33 (2); Laws 1941, c. 331, adding
N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 33 (3); Ijaws 1941, c. 330, adding N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 33 (4);
Laws 1941, c. 328, adding N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 33 (5); Laws 1937, c. 77, adding N.Y.
Pers. Prop. Law §§ 33-a, 33-b and N.Y. Real Prop. Law §§ 280, 281; see Leg. Doc. No.
65 (C), Report of Law Rev. Com. 65-373 (1936); Leg. Doc. No. 65 (K), Report of Law
Rev. Com. 201-248 (1937); Leg. Doc. No. 65 (M), Report of Law Rev. Com. 345-414
(1941).
19 Laws 1935, c. 795, adding new N.Y. Dec. Est. Law 9H 118 and 119; see Leg. Doc.
No. 60 (E), Report of Law Rev. Com. 157-225 (1935).
20 Laws 1935, c. 796, adding new N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 73; see Leg. Doc. No. 60 (C),
Report of Law Rev. Com. 47-89 (1935).
21 Laws 1946, c. 402, adding N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 977-c; see Leg. Doc. No. 65 (A),
Report of Law Rev. Com. 21-29 (1946).
22 Laws 1943, c. 561, amending N.Y. Real Prop. Law, Art. 15, and N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act
§ 425; see Leg. Doc. No. 65 (G), Report of Law Rev. Com. 628 et seq. (1943). See also
Laws 1948, c. 105, amending N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 500; Leg. Doc. No. 65 (N), Report of
Law Rev. Com. 575-599 (1948); Laws 1951, c. 610, adding N.Y. Real Prop. Law §§ 500-a,
506-a, and 506-b; Leg. Doc. No. 65 (K), Report of Law Rev. Com. 501-548 (1951).
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land,2" of judgments affecting the title to real property24 and of assignments of rent;28 the right of a tenant for life or for a term of years to
make substantial changes in existing structures on the land; 2" and the
judicial authorization of mortgages, leases and sales of real property. 1
In the field of corporation law, revisions have been made with regard
to such vital matters as the renewal of a corporation's life after the expiration of its charter; 2" the dissolution of corporations whose stockholders are evenly divided; 2 9 and the authorization of provisions in the
certificate of incorporation requiring the affirmative vote of more than a
majority or plurality of the stockholders or directors for specified kinds
of corporate action.3 0 Simplification, clarification and rearrangement of
the provisions for amendment of corporate charters 31 and for reimbursement of the litigation expenses of corporate officials have also been
effected.32
The Commission has made especially valuable contributions to the
judicial process in the form of far-reaching changes in the rules of law
affecting remedies. Under the old doctrine of election of remedies, a mistake in pursuing the wrong theory or in proceeding against an agent
rather than against his principal was often fatal and resulted in forfeiture of the right to relief.3 3 The harshness of these rules has been
23 Laws 1940, c. 745, amending N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 294; see Leg. Doc. No. 65 (E),
Report of Law Rev. Com. 157-166 (1940).
24 Laws 1949, c. 447, adding N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 297-b; see Leg. Doc. No. 65 (E),

Report of Law Rev. Com. 365-414 (1949).
25 Laws 1944, c. 262, adding N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 294-a; see Leg. Doc. No. 65 (I),
Report of Law Rev. Com. 221-289 (1944).
26 Laws 1937, c. 165, adding N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 537; see Leg. Doc. No. 65 (D),
Report of Law Rev. Com. 41-46 (1937).
27 Laws 1937, c. 141, amending N.Y. Real Prop. Law §§ 105 and 106, and adding §§ 107
and 107-a to 107-n; see Leg. Doc. No. 65 (E), Report of Law Rev. Com. 47-60 (1937).
28 Laws 1944, c. 591, adding N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 49; see Leg. Doc. No. 65 (A),
Report of Law Rev. Com. 19-32 (1944).
29 Laws 1944, c. 176, amending N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 103; see Leg. Doc. No. 65 (K),
Report of Law Rev. Com. 349-377 (1944).
30 Laws 1948, c. 862, adding N.Y. Stock Corp_,Law § 9; see Leg. Doc. No. 65 (K),
Report of Law Rev. Com. 381-427 (1948).
31 Laws 1949, c. 805, adding N.Y. Stock Corp. Law §§ 35 and 36; see Leg. Doc. No.
65 (F), Report of Law Rev. Com. 415-608 (1949).
32 Laws 1945, c. 869, amending N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 61-b, and adding new §§ 63-68;
see Leg. Doc. No. 65 (E), Report of Law Rev. Com. 131-175 (1945).
33 See, e.g., Fowler v. Bowery Savings Bank, 113 N.Y. 450, 21 N.E. 172 (1889); Terry
v. Munger, 121 N.Y. 161, 24 N.E. 272 (1890); Henry v. Herrington, 193 N.Y. 218, 221, 86
N.E. 29, 30 (1908); Georgi v. Texas Co., 225 N.Y. 410, 122 N.E. 238 (1919); Weigel v.
Cook, 237 N.Y. 136, 141-142, 142 N.E. 444, 446 (1923); Allen v. U.S. Insurance Co., 245
App. Div. 31, 282 N.Y. Supp. 420 (1st Dep't 1935), aff'd, 270 N.Y. 597, 1 N.E2d 348
(1936).
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eliminated by a series of Commission-prompted amendments, abrogating
the doctrine of election of remedies in certain situations.34 By another
amendment, the more liberal rule applied in equity cases, dispensing with
the need for tender as a condition precedent to seeking rescission, has
been extended to causes of action at law based on an executed rescission.85 Another major change has been to abandon the long settled rigid
limitation denying restitution for a mistake of law. Under the new rule,
relief against mistake is not to be refused merely because the mistake was
one of law rather than one of fact.3"
The Commission has likewise given attention to the criminal law.
Soon after its organization, it sponsored important changes affecting the
crime of perjury.31 In addition, it furthered the adoption of a modified version of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.38 The requirements with regard to advising a defendant of his right to counsel, long
prevalent in the field of indictable crimes, have been extended to prosecutions for less serious crimes and offenses.3 9 The operation of the provisions governing reduction of sentences for good behavior has been simplified.40 And modifications have been made in the rules concerning the
civil disability of convicts sentenced to state prisons. 41
A considerable number of miscellaneous statutory reforms are also
attributable to the Commission. They include authorization for the allowance of alimony in an action for the annulment of a marriage; 42 modification of the rules governing the disaffirmance of contracts made by
34 Laws 1939, cs. 126, 128, 127, 147, adding N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 112-a, 112-b, 112-c
and 112-d; Laws 1941, c. 315, adding N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 112-e; See Leg. Doc. No. 65 (F),
Report of Law Rev. Com. 205-299 (1939) ; Leg. Doc. No. 65 (L), Report of Law Rev. Com.
283-344 (1941).
85 Laws 1946, c. 683, adding N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 112-g; see Leg. Doc. No. 65 (B),
Report of Law Rev. Com. 31-78 (1946).
36 Laws 1942, c. 558, adding N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 112-f; see Leg. Doc. No. 68 (B),
Report of Law Rev. Com. 27-67 (1942).
37 Laws 1935, c. 632, amending §§ 1620, 1632, and 1633, and adding §§ 1620-a, 1620-b,
and 1632-a, of N.Y. Penal Law; see Leg. Doc. No. 60 (F), Report of Law Rev. Com. 227343 (1935).
38 Laws 1936, c. 892, adding N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. Pt. VI, Tit. IV, §§ 827-859; see
Leg. Doc. No. 65 (A), Report of Law Rev. Com. 27-58 (1936).
39 Laws 1940, c. 423, amending N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 699; see Leg. Doc. No. 65 (C),
Report of Law Rev. Com. 91-104 (1940).
40 Laws 1948, c. 631, amending N.Y. Correction Law §§ 230, 232, 235, 236, 240, 241 and
242; See Leg. Doc. No. 65 (M), Report of Law Rev. Com. 521-573 (1948).
41 Laws 1946, c. 260, amending N.Y. Penal Law § 510; see Leg. Doc. No. 65 (F), Report
of Law Rev. Com. 159-195 (1946).
42 Laws 1940, c. 226, adding N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1140-a and amending §§ 1140, 1169,
1171, 1171-a, 1171-b, 1172, 1172-a, 1172-,b, and 1172-c; See Leg. Doc. No. 65 (H), 1940
Report of Law Rev. Com. 237-297 (1940).
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infants over the age of eighteen; 43 changes in the rules concerning the
measure and distribution of damages in actions for wrongful death; 44
revision of the trust fund provisions of the Lien Law; 45 extension of the
statute of frauds to claims for business brokers' commissions; 46 liberalization and clarification of the statute governing the tolling of the statute
of limitations in cases of disability;4 7 and the adoption of new provisions
facilitating the bringing of suits against nonresident natural persons doing business within the state,48 as well as against business trusts and joint
stock associations.4 9
Apart from effecting changes in settled rules of the past, the Commission has also come to the aid of the courts in areas in which the course of
judicial decision over the years has generated uncertainty or such tenuous
refinements as to make imperative the need for clarifying legislation.
One such example is the frequently litigated question concerning
the revocability of an inter vivos trust instrument which provides for
the payment of income to the settlor during his life and for payment of
principal, upon his death, to a class described only as his heirs or next of
kin. The issue has been whether the class so described, including persons
yet unborn, constitute "persons beneficially interested," so as to prevent the settlor from revoking the trust without their consent.5 0 In
Doctor v. Hughes,51 the rule was held settled, on the basis of ancient
common law doctrine, that such trust provisions are, without more, inoperative to create any remainder interest and that, in the absence of
"clearly expressed" intention to the contrary, the settlor will be regarded
as having merely directed a reversion to himself. In consequence, the
43 Laws 1941, c. 327, adding N.Y. Debtor & Creditor Law § 260; see Leg. Doc. No.
65 (B), Report of Law Rev. Com. 43-48 (1941).
44 Laws 1949, c. 638, amending N.Y. Dec. Est. Law §§ 120, 132 and N.Y. Lien Law
§ 189 (2); Laws 1949, c. 639, amending N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 133; see Leg. Doe. No.
65 (C), Report of Law Rev. Com. 203-291 (1949).
45 Laws 1942, c. 808, adding N.Y. Lien Law, Art. 3-A, § 70-76, and amending §§ 4-a,
13, 15, 25, 29-a, 36, 36-a, and 36-b; see Leg. Doe. No. 65 (H), Report of Law Rev. Com.
271-336 (1942).
46 Laws 1949, c. 203, adding new subd.'10 to N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 31; see Leg. Doc.
No. 65 (G), Report of Law Rev. Com. 609-651 (1949).
47 Laws 1951, c. 263, amending N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 43 and 60; see Leg. Doc. No.
65 (L), Report of Law Rev. Com. 549-585 (1951).
48 Laws 1940, c. 99, adding N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 229-b; see Leg. Doe. No. 65 (D),
Report of Law Rev. Com. 105-155 (1940).
49 Laws 1937, c. 66, amending § 2, and adding §§ 18 and 19, of N.Y. Gen. Ass'n Law;
see Leg. Doec. No. 65 (L), Report of Law Rev. Com. 249-342 (1937).
50 N.Y. Fers. Prop. Law § 23; N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 118.
51 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919).
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settlor was free to revoke the trust without the consent of any of his
presumptive heirs or next of kin.52
There then followed a series of decisions in which the courts were
called upon to determine whether the design to establish a remainder
interest was "clearly expressed" in the instruments under review. Distinctions developed on the basis of slight differences in language, and it
became exceedingly difficult to predict whether the trust language in a
particular case would be held to create a reversion or a remainder. 53
The latest in this line of cases to come before the Court of Appeals was
Matter of Burchell.5 4 The trust instrument in that case reserved a power
of appointment to the settlor and provided that, in default of appointment, the principal was to pass, upon the settlor's death, to the next of
kin. A majority of the court regarded the reservation of the power of
appointment as sufficient to establish a remainder interest in the next of
kin, while the minority took the position that that reservation was of no
significance, and that, if anything, it was indicative of the settlor's desire
to retain control of the property up to the time of death and direct
its devolution thereafter.
Both opinions, however, emphasized the highly uncertain state of the
law and noted the desirability of legislation. The majority posited
the possibility of complete legislative abrogation of the rule of Doctor
v. Hughes." The minority opinion, on the other hand, suggested clarification, rather than abrogation, in view of "the volume of litigation on
the subject, the diversity of opinion, not to mention the difficulty, frequently, of decision." 6
The Law Revision Commission-on the basis of an exhaustive
study of the subject-concluded that it was impossible to formulate,
by statute, more definite criteria than the courts had been able to develop. 57 The only possible solution, therefore, was either entirely to
abandon the doctrine of Doctor v. Hughes, and recognize a remainder
52 See

225 N.Y. 305, 312, 122 N.E. 221, 222 (1919):

"But at least the ancient rule

survives to this extent, that to transform into a remainder what would ordinarily be a
reversion, the intention to work the transformation must be dearly expressed."
53 Compare the cases holding the language of the particular trust instrument sufficient to
create a remainder-e.g., Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co., 250 N.Y. 298, 165 N.E. 454
(1929); Engel v. Guaranty Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 43, 19 N.E.2d 673 (1939); Richardson v.
Richardson, 298 N.Y. 135, 81 N.E.2d 54 (1948) with those reaching contrary results, e.g.,
Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919); Matter of Scholtz v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 295 N.Y. 488, 68 N.E.2d 503 (1946).
54 299 N.Y. 351, 87 N.E.2d 293 (1949).
55 Id.

at 360, 87 N.E.2d at 297.

Id. at 362, 87 N.E.2d at 298.
57 See Leg. Doc. No. 65 (D), Report of Law Rev. Com. 79-132 (1951).
56
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interest in the heirs or next of kin in every case, or to adopt, for all cases,
the contrary rule that a limitation to heirs or next of kin would be no bar
to revocation of the trust by the settlor alone. The Commission chose the
latter alternative, because it felt that it would be contrary to previously
declared legislative policy to make the revocability of an inter vivos
trust depend upon obtaining the consent of an indefinite class comprising
persons yet unborn.5" The Commission proposed amendments, enacted
in 1951-applicable only to trusts created after their effective datewhich flatly provide that, for purposes of determining the revocability of
an inter vivos trust instrument, "a gift or limitation in favor of a class of
persons described only as heirs or next of kin or distributees of the
creator of the trust, or by other words of like import, does not create a
beneficial interest in such persons." 59
Whether one agree or disagree with the policy or soundness of these
amendments, there can be no question that they serve the salutary
purpose of providing a definite standard for future cases. The Commission's explanatory comment explicitly states that the settlor may effectually create an irrevocable remainder interest, by identifying the persons who are to receive the principal or by making the gift or limitation
to a class comprising persons other than those who would take in the
event of the settlor's intestacy. 60
The Commission has also proposed legislation designed to extend
the benefits of a newly-announced decisional rule into areas in which
the courts themselves would be powerless to grant relief. Thus, in
Estin v. Estin,, the court held that, where a wife had previously obtained a judgment of separation, with provisions for her support and
maintenance, in a New York court, those provisions survived an ex
parte divorce decree procured by the husband from a court in another
state which did not have personal jurisdiction over the wife. Although
the divorce decree effectually terminated the marriage between the parties
-since the husband had established a bona fide domicile in the other
state6 2 -the foreign court was held to be without power to adjudicate
with respect to the wife's right to support under the New York judgment or to deprive her thereof, since that out-of-state tribunal had acquired no in personam jurisdiction over her.
58 See Report, supra note 57, at 85.

59 Laws 1951, c. 180, amending N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 23 and N.Y. Real Prop. Law

§ 118.
60 See Report, supra note 57, at 86.
61 296 N.Y. 308, 73 N.E.2d 113 (1947), aff'd, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
62 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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The impact of the Estin decision, however, encompassed only the situation where the wife had previously obtained a judgment or order for
support or maintenance in this state. The courts would thus be powerless to grant relief, following rendition of the foreign divorce, to a wife
who had not obtained such a prior judgment or order. That followed
from this state's settled law that a wife may be granted support or maintenance only as an incident to a judgment of divorce, separation or annulment63 and could not secure such a judgment after the termination
of the marriage by divorce. The Commission concluded that a remedy
should be made available to the wife, even though she had not previously
obtained a judgment or order for support.64 It proposed the enactment of
a new statute-passed in 1953-authorizing the court to award alimony
to the wife in a matrimonial action notwithstanding the court's refusal
to grant her a judgment of divorce, separation or annulment because
of a prior judgment of divorce or annulment obtained by the husband in an action in which jurisdiction was lacking over the person
of the wife.65 While some may, perhaps, question the validity of this
enactment under the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, no one can doubt that the Commission has taken a bold step forward in an area in which the courts themselves would be incapable of
acting without enabling legislation.
Displaying commendable wisdom and restraint, the Commission has
confined itself each year to about fifteen or twenty subjects which seem
to call for treatment. Although not all of its recommendations have been
enacted, they have met with an extremely high degree of success in the
legislature. On some occasions, particular proposals, failing of adoption
when first offered, have been resubmitted, sometimes with amendments
designed to overcome asserted objections, and have then been approved
at a subsequent session of the legislature 6
An important proposal which the Commission first recommended in
1936, but which has not yet been accepted, although periodically renewed, is concerned with abrogation of the long-established restrictions
upon the availability of contribution among joint tortfeasors. 67 Among
See Querze v. Querze, 290 N.Y. 13, 18, 47 N.E.2d 423, 425 (1943).
See Leg. Doc. No. 65(K) (1953). [At printing, Report of Law Rev. Com. (1953)
unbound. No page citations available-Ed.]
65 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1170-b, as added by Laws 1953, c. 663.
66 See, e.g., amendment involved in Garzo v. Maid of Mist Steamboat Co., 303 N.Y.
516, 521, 104 N.E.2d 882, 885 (1952); see also, Leg. Doc. No. 65, Report of Law Rev.
Com. 15, 16 (1952); Leg. Doc. No. 65, Report of Law Rev. Com. 13-16 (1953).
67 See Leg. Doc. No. 65 (K), Report of Law Rev. Com. 699-747 (1936); Leg. Doc.
No. 65 (G), Report of Law Rev. Com. 67-82 (1937); Leg. Doc. No. 65 (G), Report of
63

64
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other proposals not adopted, have been ambitious projects for clarification of a large body of statutory law, as in the case of the Statute of
Frauds6" and the statute of limitations, 69 and for introduction of a statutory scheme for the registration of trademarks in this state.70
In a number of instances, the Commission has, after careful appraisal
of the problems, concluded that legislation is not needed or desirable. It
has in such cases submitted detailed studies on the subjects involved for
the guidance and information of the legislature and has published the
studies in its annual reports. They have provided a wealth of source
material for courts and lawyers, and have sometimes covered broad fields
of the law, including those of homicide, 7' sexual crimes,72 the Rule
Against Perpetuities,73 property rights following adoption,'74 anticipatory
breach of contract, 75 liability for injuries caused by an independent contractor7 6 and assignments of accounts receivable. 7
One of these studies, submitted without any accompanying recommendation for legislation, was made in 1935 on the subject of an infant
plaintiff's possible right of action to recover for prenatal injuries.78 The
study was made at the suggestion of the then Chief Judge of the Court
of Appeals-Cuthbert W. Pound-who in 1921 had written the opinion
for the court in Drobnerv. Peters,79 in which it was held that there was no
such right of action under the common law as it then existed. Although
its study favored a right of recovery for such injuries, the Commission
declined to propose any statutory rule on the subject, evidently considering it preferable to leave the matter for development by the courts.
In 1951, the subject was again presented to the Court of Appeals in the
Law Rev. Com. 65-88 (1938); Leg. Doc. No. 65 (A), Report of Law Rev. Com. 27-58
(1939); Leg. Doc. No. 65 (A), Report of Law Rev. Com. 17-41 (1941); Leg. Doc. No.
65 (A), Report of Law Rev. Com. 21-73 (1952).
68 See Leg. Doc. No. 65 (0) (1953), presenting the first of a number of contemplated proposals affecting the Statute of Frauds. This initial proposal is concerned with the subject
of contracts not performable within a year or a lifetime.
69 See Leg. Doc. No. 65 (H), Report of Law Rev. Com. 187-258 (1952) (effect of new
promise, acknowledgment or part payment, as tolling of statute of limitations; and effect
of agreement to extend limitations period).
70 See Leg. Doc. No. 65 (T) (1953).
71 See Leg. Doc. No. 65 (P), Report of Law Rev. Com. 515-870 (1937).
72 See Leg. Doc. No. 65 (0), Report of Law Rev. Com. 399-514 (1937).
73 See Leg. Dac. No. 65 (H), Report of Law Rev. Com. 473-608 (1936).
74 See Leg. Doc. No. 65 (G), Report of Law Rev. Com. 245-269 (1942).
75 See Leg. Doc. No. 65 (M), Report of Law Rev. Com. 385-404 (1940).
76 See Leg. Doc. No. 65 (K), Report of Law Rev. Com. 409-684 (1939).
77 See Leg. Doc. No. 65 (K), Report of Law Rev. Com. 351-652 (1946).
78 See Leg. Doc. No. 60 (H), Report of Law Rev. Com. 449-476 (1935).
79 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921).
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case of Woods v. Lancet,80 and the court overruled the Drobner decision
as based on "an outmoded, time-worn fiction not founded on fact"'" and
concluded that the interests of "common-sense justice"' demanded the
common law's recognition of a right of action by an infant for prenatal
injuries, at least in certain circumstances. The court took note of the Law
Revision Commission's study and observed that its decision not to propose any legislative change was a recognition that "it was for the courts
to deal with this common law question."" a
As much as the Commission has come to the aid of the courts in securing the legislative elimination of defects and anachronisms, so the courts
have likewise been of assistance to the Commission in highlighting or uncovering problems meriting legislative consideration. The courts, while
feeling impelled to follow prior decisions, have at times been candidly
critical of a judicially declared rule or a settled interpretation of a statutory provision and have in opinions suggested the possibility of legislative amendment, s4 in some cases calling attention to legislation on the
subject adopted in other jurisdictions.8 5 At other times, the need for legislative intervention has become apparent through judicial interpretation
revealing limitations or defects in existing statutory provisions.8 The
Commission has been alertto respond to such demonstrations of need
for legislative action, and a number of important recommendations have
8 7
resulted from such judicial commentary.
303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
Id. at 357, 102 N.E.2d at 695.
82 Id. at 355, 102 N.E.2d at 694.
83 Id. at 356, 102 N.E.2d at 695.
84 See, e.g., Cammack v. Slattery & Bro., Inc., 241 N.Y. 39, 45-46, 148 N.E. 781, 782
(1925) ; Schindler v. Royal Insurance Co., 258 N.Y. 310, 313-314, 179 N.E. 711, 712 (1932) ;
Sternieb v. Normandie Nat. Sec. Corp., 263 N.Y. 245, 250-251, 188 N.E. 726, 728 (1934);
Meyers v. Credit Lyonnais, 259 N.Y. 399, 404, 182 N.E. 61, 63 (1932); Sweet & Co. v.
Provident Loan Society, 279 N.Y. 540, 545, 18 N.E.2d 847, 848 (1939) ; Matter of Patterson,
139 Misc. 872, 875-876, 249 N.Y. Supp. 441, 444 (Surr. Ct. Kings County 1931).
85 See, e.g., Sternlieb v. Normandie Nat. Sec. Corp., 263 N.Y. 245, 251, 188 N.E. 726,
728 (1934).
86 See, e.g., Williams v. Alt, 226 N.Y. 283, 291, 123 N.E. 499, 501 (1919) ; Fox v. Western
New York Motor Lines, Inc., 257 N.Y. 305, 308-309, 178 N.E. 289, 290 (1931); Maher v.
Randolph, 275 N.Y. 80, 84, 9 N.E.2d 786, 787 (1937); Sweet v. Provident Loan Society,
279 N.Y. 540, 544-545, 18 N.E.2d 847, 848 (1939); Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc.,
294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945); Matter of Levin, 302 N.Y. 535, 90 N.E.2d 877
(1951); Burgoyne v. James, 156 Misc. 859, 282 N.Y. Supp. 18 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1935), aff'd, 246 App. Div. 605 (1st Dep't 1935); Matter of Schwimmer, 49 N.Y.S.2d 481
(Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1944).
87 For example, the recommendation with regard to the revocation of inter vivos trusts
was motivated by Matter of Burchell, 299 N.Y. 351, 87 N.E.2d 293 (1949), discussed in the
text, supra at 654 (see Leg. Doc. No. 65 (D), Report of Law Rev. Com. 79, 82, 84-85
80

81

1955]

IMPACT ON THE COURTS

III
THE Co_-SSioN's RECOMMENDATIONS

IN THE COURTS

The courts have, on the whole, experienced little difficulty in applying or interpreting the enactments recommended. It is to the
Commission's credit that there are very few cases in which any
of its proposals has presented some serious question of interpretation.
Generally speaking, the Commission-sponsored enactments have been
clear on their face and have readily lent themselves to application by
the courts in the manner intended.18
(1951); Laws 1951, c. 180, amending N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 23 and N.Y. Real Prop. Law
§ 118).
A recommendation extending the remedy of summary proceedings to cases involving a
holding over by a tenant of a life tenant whose life estate has terminated or by a licensee
whose license has terminated, carried out suggestions made in Williams v. Alt, 226 N.Y. 283,
291, 123 N.E. 499, 501 (1919) (see Leg. Doc. No. 65 (C), Report of Law Rev. Com. 43,
49 (1951); Laws 1951, c. 273, amending N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 1411 and 1414).
Modifications limiting the disaffirmance of contracts by infants over the age of eighteen
years, were prompted by the comments of the Court of Appeals in Sternlieb v. Normandie
Nat. Sec. Corp., 263 N.Y. 240, 250-251, 188 N.E. 726, 728 (1934) (see Leg. Doc. No. 65 (B),
Report of Law Rev. Com. 43-48 (1941); Laws 1941, c. 327, adding N.Y. Debtor & Creditor
Law § 260).
A proposal to overcome the long settled rule that an unincorporated association lacked
capacity to receive a devise or bequest, followed strong condemnation of that rule in Matter
of Patterson, 139 Misc. 872, 876, 249 N.Y. Supp. 441, 444 (Surr. Ct. Kings County 1931)
(see Leg. Doc. No. 65 (F), Report of Law Rev. Com. 147-161 (1952); Laws 1952, c. 832,
adding N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 47-e).
A clarifying amendment to § 18 of the N.Y. Dec. Est. Law was prompted by the
opinion in Matter of Schwimmer, 49 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1944), pointing
out the troublesome obscurities and ambiguities in the legislative text (see Leg. Doc. No.
65 (H), Report of Law Rev. Com. 227-266 (1946); Leg. Doc. No. 65 (A), Report of Law
Rev. Com. 21-26 (1947); Laws 1947, c. 379).
A recommendation to change the New York rule that a bondholder's claim for breach
of trust against a trustee under an indenture securing the bond issue did not pass with a
transfer of the bond, in the absence of an express assignment, was the result of the strong
criticism of that rule in Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corporation, 154 F.2d 978, 1000-1001
(2d Cir. 1946) (see Leg. Doc. No. 65 (D), Report of Law Rev. Com. 67-94 (1950); Laws
1950, c. 812, amending N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 41).
There have also been other recommendations, similarly motivated, which have not been
enacted. See, e.g., Leg. Doc. No. 65 (A), Report of Law Rev. Com. 19-39 (1940) (recommendation to extend statutory protection to purchaser from factor who obtains possession
by fraud, motivated by comments in Sweet v. Provident Loan Society, 279 N.Y. 540, 545,
18 N.E.2d 847, 848 (1939)); Leg. Doc. No. 65 (E), Report of Law Rev. Com. 95-130
(1950) (proposal with respect to allowance of interest upon recovery of damages for violation of property rights, prompted by criticism of existing rule in Flamm v. Noble, 296 N.Y.
262, 268, 72 N.E.2d 886, 888 (1947)).
88 See, e.g., People v. Samuels, 284 N.Y. 410, 414-415, 31 N.E.2d 753, 754 (1940) (amendments concerning crime of perjury); Fitzgerald v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 290 N.Y.
376, 379-380, 49 N.E.2d 489, 491 (1943) (enactment anent election of remedies); Johnson
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That does not mean, though, that the Commission's proposals have always had smooth sailing. It has sometimes found it necessary to propose
further revision of its previously adopted recommendation, in order to
overcome a judicial interpretation which has revealed ambiguities in the
statute or has yielded a result deemed by the Commission to be unduly
restrictive.
Green v. Doniger 9 reflects such an instance. The case arose under
section 33-c of the Personal Property Law, which was adopted on
the Commission's recommendation in 1941.90 As originally enacted, that
section provided that "An executory agreement hereafter made shall be
ineffective to change or modify, or to discharge in whole or in part, a
written agreement or other written instrument hereafter executed which
contains a provision to the effect that it cannot be changed orally, unless
such executory agreement is in writing and signed by the party against
whom enforcement of the change, modification or discharge is sought."191
The Green case involved a written employment agreement entered
into by a salesman with his employer. It provided that, while the contract could not be changed or amended except by a writing signed by
both parties, it could be terminated by either party upon thirty days'
written notice to the other. The issue presented was whether, notwithstanding section 33-c of the Personal Property Law, the parties could
enter into a binding oral agreement to abandon the contract and substitute a new oral agreement of employment containing most of the terms
of the written contract, but adding additional provisions for payment of
a bonus. A majority of the court held that the application of the statutory prohibitions to a given contract depended "upon the intent of the
parties as expressed by the inclusion or exclusion, in some form, of the
statutory clause, prohibiting oral change"; and that, in the contract before the court, the parties had expressed their intent to depart from the
statutory rule as respects the matter of termination, since the contract
v. Johnson, 295 N.Y. 477, 480, 68 N.E2d 499, 500 (1946) Ochanges as to allowance of
alimony in actions for annulment); Garzo v. Maid of Mist Steamboat Co., 303 N.Y. 516,
521-522, 104 N.E.2d 882, 885 (1952) (statute permitting revival of corporation after expiration of charter); Rehill v. Rehill, 306 N.Y. 126, 131, 116 N.E.2d 281, 283 (1953)
(amendment concerning modification of written contract); Fonthehn v. Third Avenue
Railway Co., 257 App. Div. 147, 148, 150-151, 12 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92, 94-95 (1st Dep't 1939)
(changes affecting survival of causes of action for personal injury).
89 300 N.Y. 238, 90 N.E.2d 56 (1949).
90 Laws 1941, c. 329; see Leg. Doc. No. 65 (M), Report of Law Rev. Com. 345-414
(1941).
91 The section was amended in 1944, on the Commission's recommendation, to permit
the writing to be signed by an agent. Laws 1944, c. 588; see Leg. Doc. No. 65 (E), Report
of Law Rev. Com. 103-129 (1944).
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provided for termination by either party merely upon written notice to
the other, and without the latter's consent or signature.92 It was further
held that, in accordance with the general law of contracts, the parties
could abandon the contract by mutual consent, without any writing, even
though they simultaneously entered into a new oral contract containing
one or more of the terms of the abandoned contract.9 3 On the other hand,
a minority of the court regarded the decision as a frustration of the purpose and design of the statute.94
The Commission shortly thereafter recommended amendment of the
statute to overcome the Green decision. A bill introduced in the legislature in 1951 passed both houses, but was vetoed by the Governor 5
The Commission revised its recommendations, and a new bill was introduced the following year and was then enacted into law 6 The 1952
amendment, spelling out with greater precision the design that binding
effect be given to contractual provisions against oral termination or discharge, expressly specified that such provisions would bar an oral termination even by mutual consent which did no more than substitute another executory agreement for the prior contract.
Another instance in which one of the Commission's recommendations stirred judicial controversy was presented in Matter of Radom &
Neidorf, Inc.9 7 That case arose under a Commission-sponsored amendment to section 103 of the General Corporation Law, which permits a
petition for dissolution of a corporation by the holders of one half of
the shares of stock entitled to vote for directors "if the votes of [the]
98
stockholders are so divided that they cannot elect a board of directors.1
The Court of Appeals divided four to three on the question whether the
financial condition of the corporation was a factor relevant for consideration in passing upon such a petition. The majority was of the opinion that
was a weighty factor militating
.the prosperous condition of the company
against the petition for dissolution. 9 The minority of the court, however,
observed that dissolution under section 103, depending as it did solely on
92 300 N.Y. 238, 244-245, 90 N.E.2d 56, 59 (1949).
93 Id. at 245, 90 N.E.2d at 59.
94 Id. at 246-247, 90 N.E.2d at 60.
9G See Leg. Doc. No. 65 (N), Report of Law Rev. Com. 659-678 (1951); Report of Law
Rev. Com. 20 (1952).
96 See Leg. Doc. No. 65 (E), Report of Law Rev. Com. 139-145 (1952); Laws 1952,
c. 831.
97 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954).
98 Laws 1944, c. 176; see Leg. Doc. No. 65 (K), Report of Law Rev. Com. 349-377
(1944).
99 307 N.Y. 1, 7, 119 N.E.2d 563, 565 (1954).
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the existence of a deadlock, required no showing of insolvency, such as
was specifically made requisite under other sections of the General Corporation Law. 10 0 Both the majority and the minority cited the Law Revision Commission's report-the majority for the proposition that the court
was bound to consider the general welfare of the stockholders, 10 and the
minority in support of the argument that the only criterion envisaged
by the Commission was that of a deadlock between the stockholders. 0 2
Of major assistance to the courts in the interpretation of statutes resulting from the Commission's proposals, are the explanatory notes and
comments which accompany such proposals. The Commission has made
it a practice to append a brief explanation of its proposal to each of the
bills introduced in the legislature upon its recommendation. These notes
remain appended to the printed law which results from the recommendation, and they are obviously pertinent and persuasive source material for
ascertaining the design and purpose of the legislation.0 3 More detailed
explanatory comments are submitted in the legislative documents which
are transmitted to the legislature together with the drafts of proposed
legislation. Since these comments are thus also directly brought to the
attention of the legislature, they likewise are relevant interpretive aids
in searching for the legislative intent in the event of any apparent ambiguity in the text of the statute. 0 4
On a number of occasions, the courts have looked to the Commission's
explanatory notes and comments for guidance.0 5 In one case,
100 Id. at 12-14, 119 N.E.2d at 568-969.
101 Id. at 7, 119 N.E.2d at 565.
102

Id. at 13, 119 N.E.2d at 568.

103 See Matter of Greenberg, 141 Misc. 874, 882, 253 N.Y. Supp. 667, 677 (Surr. Ct.

Kings County 1931), aff'd, 236 App. Div. 733 (2d Dep't 1932), aff'd, 261 N.Y. 474, 185 N.E.
704 (1933); Matter of Fisher v. State Retirement System, 279 App. Div. 315, 318, 110
N.Y.S.2d 16, 19 (3d Dep't 1952), aff'd, 304 N.Y. 899, 110 N.E.2d 733 (1953); Matter of
McGarry, 155 Misc. 467, 469, 280 N.Y. Supp. 202, 204 (Surr. Ct. Kings County 1935),
modified 245 App. Div. 834 (2d Dep't 1935), aff'd, 270 N.Y. 514, 200 N.E. 296 (1936) ; cf.
Manice v. Manice, 43 N.Y. 303, 375, 376, 378 (1871); The People v. Conroy, 97 N.Y. 62,
69-70 (1884).
104 See People v. Samuels, 284 N.Y. 410, 414-415, 31 N.E.2d 753, 754 (1940); Johnson
v. Johnson, 295 N.Y. 477, 480-481, 68 N.E.2d 499, 500 (1946); Garzo v. Maid of Mist
Steamboat Co., 303 N.Y. 516, 522, 104 N.E.2d 882 (1952); Fontheim v. Third Avenue
Railway Co., 257 App. Div. 147, 150-151, 12 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92, 94-95 (1st Dep't 1939). See
also 2 Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction §§ 5006, 5008, 5010 (3d ed., Horack,
1943).
105 See, e.g., People v. Samuels, 284 N.Y. 410, 414-415, 31 N.E.2d 753, 754 (1940);
Fitzgerald v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 290 N.Y. 376, 380, 49 N.E.2d 489, 491 (1943) ;
Johnson v. Johnson, 295 N.Y. 477, 480-481, 68 N.E.2d 499, 500 (1946); Garzo v. Maid of
Mist Steamboat Co., 303 N.Y. 516, 522, 104 N.E.2d 882, 885 (1952); Fontheim v. Third
Avenue Railway Co., 257 App. Div. 147, 151, 12 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92 (1st Dep't 1939).
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indeed, the court cited, in support of its conclusion, a discussion in the
Commission's report of the very problem under review. 0 6 Commentary
of this kind, of course, affords greater assurance that the underlying
purpose of the enactment will be fully achieved.
The question has been presented, however, whether the studies prepared at the direction of the Commission, and on the basis of which its
recommendations are made, should also be treated as pertinent sources
for interpreting the resulting legislation. Some of these studies are prepared by research assistants on the Commission's staff, and some by special consultants, frequently law professors. While each study forms the
background for the Commission's particular recommendation, and finds
space in its annual report, the Commission does not formally
adopt or approve the analysis or conclusions of the study as its own
product. The Commission, instead, sets forth its own views in a separate
document entitled "Recommendation," which generally embodies a
briefer treatment of the underlying problems and the current state of the
decisional and statutory law, as well as an explanatory discussion of the
proposed legislation.
Undoubtedly, the study is, in any case, pertinent reference material for
ascertaining the background of the statute and the problems or defedts
which motivated its adoption. 0 7 To that extent, certainly, the study is as
proper an aid as would be independent research into the prior law. Where,
however, an issue arises as to the meaning of some particular provision
of the statute or as to its applicability to a particular situation, the study
itself may not be regarded as persuasive a clue to the legislative design as
are the Commission's own comments.
That issue recently came before the Court of Appeals in Matter of
Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp.' The case involved the interpretation of article 6-A of the General Corporation Law, as amended
09
in 1945 upon the recommendation of the Law Revision Commission.
Section 64 provides for assessment against a corporation of the expenses
of any person made a party to "any action, suit or proceeding" because of
his being an officer, director or employee of the corporation, unless it
shall have been adjudged that he was liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance of his duties. The question for decision was
106 See Kane Realty Co., Inc. v. Nat. Children's Stores, Inc., 169 Misc. 699, 701, 8
N.Y.S.2d 905, 507 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1938).
107 Cf. Matter of Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 7, 119 N.E.2d 563, 565 (1954).
108 305 N.Y. 395, 113 N.E.2d 533 (1953).
109 Laws 1948, c. 869, see Leg. Doc. No. 65 (E), Report of Law Rev. Com. 131-175

(1945).
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whether those provisions embraced expenses incurred by a director in defense of a criminal prosecution, to which the corporation was also a.party
defendant, for alleged violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
The statute permits an application for the assessment of the expenses to be made either in the action, suit or proceeding in which they
have been incurred or in a separate proceeding in the Supreme Court.
The purpose of the latter provision, as explained in the study accompanying the Commission's recommendation, was to provide a remedy for certain types of actions which might be covered by the broad language,
"action, suit or proceeding," yet in which the court might lack the necessary equitable jurisdiction to determine the right to indemnity or to make
allowances." ° As an example of such an action, there was specifically
mentioned, in a footnote in the study, "a criminal proceeding against the
corporation and its officers or directors for violation of the anti-trust
i
laws."'
By a closely divided vote, the Court of Appeals, nevertheless, held that
the statute did not apply to expenses incurred in the defense of a criminal
action. The author of one of the opinions for the majority of the court declined to attach any significance to the discussion of the matter in the
study, stating:
There just is no evidence whatever that the Legislature was talking about
criminal cases. Appellant gets some comfort from a brief, equivocal footnote in a study, made by an attorney employed by the Law Revision Commission, and attached to the 1945 Report of the Law Revision Commission.
The writer of that study said in the footnote that it had been urged that
the language of section 64 ('any action, suit or proceeding') might cover
a criminal proceeding for violation of the antitrust law. But that was a
mere comment by the writer of a study made for the commission, referring
to a contention made, or which might be made, by. somebody else that the
section might be applicable in a criminal cause. There is nothing to indicate that the Legislature, or, indeed, the Law Revision Commission, ever
had any such thing in mind." 2
In the view'of the three dissenting judges, on the other hand, the comments made in the study were entitled to great weight as pointing to the
legislative intent, since they clearly indicated the reason for the legislature's adoption of the provision authorizing a separate proceeding in
the Supreme Court for the assessment of expenses." 3
Apart from furnishing guidance in the construction of statutes, the
Commission's recommendations and the accompanying studies may also
110 See Report, supra note 109, at 161.
Li See Report, supra note 109, at 161, fn. 36.
112 305 N.Y. 395, 401-402, 113 N.E.2d 533, 535 (1953).
113 Id. at 408-9, 113 N.E.2d at 539.
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serve the courts as intelligent and learned discussions of the basic subject
matter of the proposals. Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone long ago suggested that the c6ordination of court-declared and legislatively-enacted
law into a single system could be better accomplished if the courts would
accord "recognition to statutes as starting points for judicial law-making
comparable to judicial decisions."" 4 Justice Stone urged the courts to
treat a statute, not merely as a command to govern the precise situations
defined by it, but more like a judicial precedent, "as both a declaration
and source of law, and as a premise for legal reasoning," in order to extend its application to analogous situations." 5 That same thought has
also recently been expressed in a federal case, in which the New York
courts were urged to apply the principle behind a certain amendment,
enacted upon the recommendation of the Commission, to cases not within
its precise terms." 6
There is, of course, no assurance that the courts are prepared tb apply
the principles underlying particular statutory reforms as premises for
"judicial law-making" in cases coming within the spirit, though not the
letter, of the statutes. If, however, the courts should, in the future, adopt
such an approach, the explanatory comments and studies of the Commission would provide a particularly valuable aid for the further growth
and development of the judicial process.
IV
TmE COMMISSION'S ROLE FOR THE FUTURE
In a legal society constantly striving for betterment and growth, the
need for a Ministry of Justice and the vital role it serves, of mediating
between courts and legislature, is necessarily a continuing one." 7 While
the Law Revision Commission has already scored outstanding gains in
the battle for law reform, there is undoubtedly much that remains to be
done. Apart from an imposing agenda of topics for future consideration," 8 the Commission has for the past two years been devoting itself
to a comprehensive study and analysis of the lengthy proposed Uniform
Commercial Code that has been drafted under the joint auspices of the
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners
11 See Stone, "The Common Law in the United States," 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 12 (1936).
115 See Stone, supra note 114, at 12-15. But cf. Pound, "What of Stare Decisis?" 10
Fordham L. Rev. 1, 12 (1941).
116 See Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co., 206 F.2d 103, 107
(2d Cir. 1953) ; cf. Fitzgerald v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 290 N.Y. 376, 380, 49 N.E.2d
489, 492 (1943).
117 See Cardozo, "A Ministry of Justice," 35 Harv. L. Rev. 113 (1921).
118 See, e.g., Leg. Doc. No. 65, Report of Law Rev. Com. 9-11 (1953).
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on Uniform State Laws." 9 In addition to its own research, the Commission has held public hearings in various areas of the state in an endeavor
to marshal informed opinion as to the soundness of the proposed Code
and its adaptability to the law of this state.
The courts as well as the legislature have accepted the Commission as
the official medium for investigating and fashioning proposed statutory
correctives for maladjustments in the substantive law. In a recent case,
for instance, in commenting upon changes in the law that might better
be reserved for legislative action, the Court of Appeals specifically noted
that such matters would be "peculiarly appropriate for Law Revision
Commission scrutiny."' 2 And, on their part, the courts are on hand
to scrutinize and apply the results of the Commission's studies and
recommendations. By such continued mutual cooperation of courts and
Commission, we may hope in time to achieve the full promise of a Ministry of Justice.
119 See Report of Law Rev. Com. (1955).
120 See Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 356, 102 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1951).

